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ALONG FOR THE RIDE: 
REGULATING TRANSPORTATION NETWORK 
COMPANIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On New Year’s Eve, 2013, a vehicle struck and killed six-year-old Sofia Liu as she 
crossed the street with her family.1 Sofia’s mother and five-year-old brother sustained 
serious injuries in the incident.2 The family had the right of way to cross the street when 
the driver, failing to yield, turned right and struck them.3 The driver of the vehicle, Syed 
Muzaffar, drove for Uber.4 Uber is a ridesharing company, also known as a transportation 
network company (TNC) under some regulations.5 Though Muzaffar did not have 
passengers in his vehicle at the time of the incident, he reportedly had the Uber app open 
and active in his vehicle.6 Uber initially refused to cover the accident with its insurance, 
arguing that a driver must have passengers in the car in order to qualify for Uber insurance 
coverage.7 Sofia’s family filed suit against Uber, and those parties reached an undisclosed 
settlement in July 2015.8 Had Syed Muzaffar driven for a taxi company at the time of the 
accident, the company’s insurance would have automatically covered the accident in full, 
regardless of the absence of passengers in Muzaffar’s vehicle.9 
Uber, like other TNCs, “connects riders to drivers through . . . [smartphone] apps.”10 
TNCs operating throughout the United States include, among others, Uber, Lyft, and 
Sidecar.11 When a customer wishes to use a TNC, they download a company’s app onto 
                                                          
 1. Complaint at 4, Liu v. Uber, No. CGC-14-53-6979 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Liu 
Complaint]; David Streitfeld, Uber and a Child’s Death, Bits, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2014, 7:00 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/uber-and-a-childs-death/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
 2. Liu Complaint, supra note 1, at 4; Alyson Shontell, Uber and UberX Lawsuit, BUS. INSIDER, (Jan. 27, 
2014, 4:21 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-and-uberx-lawsuit-2014-1. 
 3. Liu Complaint, supra note 1, at 4. 
 4. Id. at 5; Shontell, supra note 2. 
 5. The California Public Utilities Commission “defines a TNC as an organization whether a corporation, 
partnership, sole proprietor, or other form, operating in California that provides prearranged transportation 
services for compensation using [an app] to connect passengers with drivers using their personal vehicles.” 
Decision Adopting Rule and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New Entrants to the 
Transportation Industry, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N R. 12-12-011 (2013) [hereinafter California Decision on 
Regulations]. 
 6. Liu Complaint, supra note 1, at 5. 
 7. Streitfeld, supra note 1. 
 8. Liu Complaint, supra note 1; Order Granting Petition to Approve Compromise of a Minor’s Claim, Liu, 
No. CGC-14-53-6979. 
 9. Barry Korengold, Insurance? We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Insurance, S.F. CAB DRIVER’S ASS’N (Aug. 
12, 2014), http://www.sfcda.org/archives/1316. 
 10. The Company, UBER, https://www.uber.com/about. 
 11. California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5; The Company, UBER, https://www.uber.com/about; 
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their smartphone and enter their credit card information.12 The customer opens the app 
any time they want a ride, and a map shows the customer’s location in relation to available 
drivers at that moment in time.13 Once a customer requests a ride, the app provides the 
passenger with the name of the driver, the driver’s customer rating, the make and model 
of the driver’s vehicle, and the vehicle’s license plate number.14 The driver then receives 
a notification on their TNC-supplied smartphone and picks the customer up at the specified 
location.15 Once the driver drops the passenger at their destination, the customer pays 
through the smartphone app.16 Drivers do not directly receive the customer’s credit card 
information, and tips are both uncommon and discouraged.17 Unlike taxi companies, TNC 
drivers are typically freelance drivers who decide when and how often they wish to drive 
for the TNC.18 
As revealed by the dispute that arose after Sofia Liu’s death, a variety of legal issues 
plague the innovative TNC business model.19 Due to the initial absence of TNC 
regulations, taxi companies, as well as other TNC competitors, continue to raise concerns 
with the safety issues and unfair competitive advantages that TNCs present in communities 
nationwide.20 State regulation—rather than sweeping legislation at the federal level or 
taxi-favoring regulation at the local level—is the most effective solution for the myriad 
concerns and legal issues that TNCs raise in the United States. 
Part II explores the background of TNC regulation, including comparisons to other 
for-hire services and the primary concerns associated with TNCs.21 Part II also discusses 
existing TNC regulations at both the state and local level.22 Part III examines the 
constitutional considerations, both the advantages and disadvantages associated with 
federal TNC regulation, and regulatory options at the federal level.23 Next, Parts IV and 
V discuss important considerations in the power to regulate TNCs, as well as advantages 
and disadvantages of both state and local regulation.24 Lastly, Part VI balances the risks 
and benefits associated with each level of regulation, concluding that state regulation is 
                                                          
LYFT, www.lyft.com; SIDECAR, http://www.side.cr. 
 12. Ryan Ermy, Taxis Get a Run for Their Money: Private Car Services Can be Cheaper, KIPLINGER’S PERS. 
FIN., Apr. 2014, at 13. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See generally David Fagan, Life as an Uber Driver: It’s Just Not Fare, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2014, 
3:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-fagin/life-as-an-uber-driver_b_4698299.html. 
 16. Ermy, supra note 12. 
 17. See generally id.; see also Do I Have to Tip My Driver?, UBER, https://support.uber.com/hc/en-
us/articles/202290128-Do-I-have-to-tip-my-driver. 
 18. Cord Jefferson, Car and Driver, L.A. MAG., Feb. 2014, at 68, 70. 
 19. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5; see also Anna Gallegos, The Four Biggest Legal 
Problems Facing Uber, Lyft and Other Ridesharing Services, LEXBLOG NETWORK (June 4, 2014), 
http://www.lxbn.com/2014/06/04/top-legal-problems-facing-uber-lyft-ridesharing-services. 
 20. Taxi companies and other for-hire companies, like limousines, have filed suit against TNCs, alleging that 
their practices are unlawful. See generally Boston Cab Dispatch v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2015 
WL 314131 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2015); see also Manzo v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 13 C 2407, 2014 WL 3495401 
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014); Yellow Grp. v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 12 C 7967, 2014 WL 3396055 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 
2014). 
 21. See discussion infra Part II. 
 22. See discussion infra Part II. 
 23. See discussion infra Part III. 
 24. See discussion infra Part IV; see also discussion infra Part V. 
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the best option for TNC regulation.25 
II. BACKGROUND 
TNCs have various competitive advantages over other vehicle for-hire services, like 
taxicabs or limousines.26 For example, the TNC experience is often a better experience for 
customers, with cleaner vehicles and friendlier drivers than taxicabs, as well as an easier 
(and more secure) payment method.27 Additionally, the first independent study comparing 
taxis to TNCs found that taxis have a much slower response time than TNCs.28 
TNCs’ competitive advantages undoubtedly affected the taxi industry during the 
past few years, as the average number of rides taken per taxi dramatically decreased from 
March 2012 to July 2014.29 During that time period, the average number of rides taken 
per taxi per month in San Francisco fell from 1,400 rides to only 500 rides.30 This is the 
same time period in which TNCs began launching and expanding in San Francisco.31 
TNC competitors continue to protest throughout the United States, urging cities and 
states to either ban the companies or even the playing field.32 Competitors argue that the 
true advantage for TNCs—and the reason behind the declining taxi industry—can be 
recognized through a comparison of taxi regulations to TNC regulations, or lack thereof.33 
Although cities and states continue to evaluate regulatory options, federal, state, and local 
governments face an assortment of issues in determining which regulatory path to take.34 
                                                          
 25. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 26. See generally Jefferson, supra note 18. The term “vehicle for-hire,” or alternatively, “for-hire vehicle” 
includes “any motor vehicle, when used for transporting persons or goods for compensation.” FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 320.01(15)(a) (West 2013). The term “limousine” is used to describe more than just one type of vehicle. 
Washington uses the term “limousine” to include stretch limousines, executive sedans, executive vans, classic 
cars, executive SUVs, and stretch SUVs. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 308-83-010(12) (2012). 
 27. Larry Downes, Uber’s Battle in Seattle Highlights the Irony of Regulation Hurting the Consumers it was 
Designed to Help, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2014/03/24/ubers-battle-in-seattle-highlights-the-irony-
of-regulation-hurting-the-consumers-it-was-designed-to-help. 
 28. Lisa Rayle et al., App-Based, On-Demand Ride-Services: Comparing Taxi and Ridesourcing Trips and 
User Characteristics in San Francisco, 12 (Aug. 2014) (unpublished dissertation, University of California). 
 29. Emily Badger, This Chart Bodes Very Badly for the Taxi Industry in Its Battle Against Uber, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/09/17/this-chart-bodes-very-badly-
for-the-taxi-industry-in-its-battle-against-uber. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See generally Charles J. Johnson, Timeline: History of Uber, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 11, 2015, 10:12 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/technology/chi-timeline-ubers-controversial-rise-20150205-
htmlstory.html; see also Nicholas Carlson, Lyft, A Year-Old Startup that Helps Strangers Share Car Rides, Just 
Raised $60 Million from Andreesson Horowitz and Others, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2013, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/lyft-a-startup-that-helps-strangers-share-car-rides-just-raised-60-million-from-
andreessen-horowitz-2013-5. 
 32. See Eric Snyder, Taxi Drivers Protest Proposed Regulations for Uber, Lyft, NASHVILLE BUS. J. (Oct. 30, 
2014, 6:59 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/morning_call/2014/10/taxi-drivers-protest-proposed-
regulations-for-uber.html; see also Martine Powers, Taxi Drivers Protest at Uber’s Boston Offices, BOS. GLOBE 
(May 22, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/05/22/taxi-drivers-protest-uber-boston-
offices/0YlRN0hHAHVhcxFIQ2X5aI/story.html. 
 33. Jefferson, supra note 18, at 70. 
 34. See generally Jacob Huebert, Illinois Gov. Pat Quinn Vetoes Uber Bill, ILL. POL’Y (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://www.illinoispolicy.org/governor-vetoes-uber-bill; see also Bill Virgin, Welcome to the New World of 
Ridesharing (or Lack Thereof), NEWS TRIB. (Apr. 6, 2014), 
http://www.thenewstribune.com/2014/04/06/3135633/welcome-to-the-new-world-of-ridesharing.html. 
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A. Taxi Regulations 
The long history of the taxicab industry provides insight into the sizeable gap 
between tightly regulated taxicabs and, at one point in time, scarcely regulated TNCs.35 
Taxicabs began appearing in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, and 
taxis became increasingly more popular in the 1920s and 1930s.36 TNCs, on the other 
hand, first appeared in 2009—less than a decade ago.37 In the 1970s and 1980s, various 
initiatives pushed for taxi regulations in order to ensure the safety of drivers and 
passengers, causing taxi regulation to swell across the country.38 
New York City is perhaps one of the greatest illustrations of taxi regulation.39 The 
New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission governs the taxi regulations in the city.40 
Specifically, “[t]he Commission . . . issue[s] licenses and adopt[s] and enforce[s] rules 
regulating the business and industry of the . . . for-hire transportation services in the 
City.”41 
Today, the stringent taxi regulations in New York City impose various requirements 
on taxicab drivers, including that drivers must: be at least nineteen years old; hold a 
chauffer’s license; present a summary of their driving record if another state issued their 
driver’s license; pass a mental and physical examination; be familiar with the city and 
traffic laws; pass a drug test; give fingerprints; and complete various trainings.42 Further, 
New York City taxi drivers must pay an annual fee of eighty-four dollars to maintain their 
license in the city.43 Taxicab drivers and companies also face the expensive challenge of 
acquiring medallions, which are rare, government-issued taxi permits.44 New York City 
attempts to keep the number of medallions lower than the demand for rides, resulting in 
NYC taxi medallions going for nearly $1 million apiece.45 Additionally, the city requires 
that taxicabs carry at least $300,000 in insurance coverage per incident.46 Taxi regulation 
stays at the municipal level in New York, even for taxi license requirements.47 
San Francisco is another city in the United States with a longstanding taxicab 
industry.48 Like New York, taxi regulations in California are left to the municipal 
                                                          
 35. See generally Taxi History, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/taxidreams/history/history_2.html. 
 36. Id. 
 37. The Company, UBER, https://www.uber.com/about. 
 38. Taxi History, supra note 35. 
 39. See History, N.Y.C. TAXI OF TOMORROW, 
http://nyc.gov/html/media/totweb/taxioftomorrow_history_themoderntaxi.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 40. N.Y.C., N.Y., ch. 52, § 52-01 (2014). 
 41. Id. § 52-02. 
 42. N.Y.C., N.Y., ch. 54, § 54-04(a)-(e), (g)-(h), (k) (2014). 
 43. Id. § 54-07(a). 
 44. See generally N.Y.C., N.Y., ch. 54, § 54-22(e); see also Rohin Dhar, The Tyranny of the Taxi Medallions, 
PRICEONOMICS (Apr. 10, 2013), http://blog.priceonomics.com/post/47636506327/the-tyranny-of-the-taxi-
medallions. 
 45. Antonio Antenucci, Taxi Medallion Auctioned for Record-Setting $965,000, N.Y. POST (Feb. 26, 2014, 
2:19 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/02/26/taxi-medallion-auctioned-for-record-setting-965000/; Joshua Brustein, 
Uber’s Fare War on New York Taxis Puts Million-Dollar Medallions at Risk, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 
7, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-07-07/ubers-fare-war-on-new-york-taxis-puts-million-
dollar-medallions-at-risk. 
 46. N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, VEHICLE INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS (2014). 
 47. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ch. 52, § 52-01. 
 48. See Heidi Machen & Jordanna Thigpen, Overview of the San Francisco Taxi Industry and Proposition 
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governments.49 The San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency regulates taxis in the 
city.50 In order for a driver to become a licensed taxi driver, San Francisco requires that 
the driver provide fingerprints, pass a written examination, pass a physical examination, if 
required, and successfully complete a driver training course.51 Additionally, taxi drivers 
must be legal residents of the United States; be at least twenty-one years old; hold a valid 
California driver’s license; and read, write, and speak English.52 
San Francisco taxicab drivers and companies pay a variety of fees in order to operate 
in the city.53 Drivers, for example, must pay both an initial permit fee and an annual driver 
renewal fee.54 San Francisco medallions are the bulk of taxi company expenses; the third-
largest taxi company in the city, with a fleet of 204 vehicles, pays nearly $500,000 in 
medallion fees monthly.55 San Francisco regulations also require that taxis carry at least 
$1 million in liability insurance.56 Further, liability insurance must cover taxis at all times, 
regardless of whether the taxi has a passenger at the time of an incident.57 
New York and San Francisco illustrate the various regulations taxicab drivers and 
companies face around the country.58 Drivers must satisfy a wide range of requirements 
and fees in order to legally operate a taxicab and transport passengers.59 
B. Contrasting Business and Regulatory Models 
In Boston Cab v. Uber, a Boston taxicab company alleged that, “Uber has gained an 
unfair competitive advantage over [taxicab companies] because it avoids the costs and 
burdens of complying with extensive regulations designed [for the benefit of Boston 
citizens].”60 The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied 
Uber’s Motion to Dismiss in that case, noting that “common economic sense” implies that 
Uber’s business has a “high likelihood of affecting the revenue of Boston medallioned 
taxis.”61 Business and regulatory models of TNC competitors, therefore, are an important 
consideration in determining a regulatory path for TNCs.62 
Though similarities exist, the differences between TNCs, taxicabs, and limousine 
                                                          
K, TAXI LIBRARY (Nov. 2007), http://www.taxi-library.org/overview-of-prop-k.pdf. 
 49. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, Basic Information for Passenger Carriers and Applicants, TRANSP. LICENSE 
SECTION at 11, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/42294D2B-412E-466E-A74B-
F1862BFC6924/0/PassengerCarriersBasicInfoandApplicantsRev012811.pdf [hereinafter California PUC Basic 
Information]. 
 50. See S.F., CAL., TRANSP. CODE § 1101 (2014). 
 51. Id. § 1103(c)(1)(A)-(D). 
 52. Id. § 1103(c)(2)(A), (D), (H). 
 53. Id. § 320. 
 54. Id. 
 55. S.F., CAL., TRANSP. CODE § 320; Jessica Kwong, Death of the Taxi Medallion: SF Cab Company 
Ponders Major Change, EXAMINER (July 23, 2014), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/death-of-the-taxi-
medallion-sf-cab-company-ponders-major-change/Content?oid=2856068. 
 56. Korengold, supra note 9. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See generally N.Y.C., N.Y., ch. 54; see also S.F., CAL., TRANSP. CODE § 1103. 
 59. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ch. 54; see also S.F., CAL., TRANSP. CODE § 1103; see also S.F., CAL., TRANSP. CODE 
§ 320. 
 60. Boston Cab Dispatch v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2015 WL 314131, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 
26, 2015). 
 61. Id. at *3. 
 62. See generally Boston Cab, 2015 WL 314131 at *3. 
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services illustrate that not all for-hire companies are created equal and, therefore, do not 
require identical regulatory models.63 TNCs and taxicabs typically charge customers 
based on the distance and duration of one ride.64 Conversely, limousine services charge 
customers a set hourly rate for a required number of hours.65 While taxicab companies 
pick customers up from the sidewalk on demand, limousine services typically require 
advance reservations for their services.66 TNCs, however, use a smartphone app for on-
demand reservations.67 Further, taxi companies are often owned and operated in one city 
or region.68 Some limousine services also operate locally or regionally, while many 
national limousine services exist as well.69 On the other hand, TNCs operate on a national 
and, in some cases, an international scale.70 Moreover, a comparison of price differences 
shows that Uber is cheaper than taxicabs in most cities.71 
Due to differing business models between taxicabs and limousine services, taxicab 
regulation differs from limousine service regulation around the country.72 Like San 
Francisco and New York City taxicab regulation, the majority of taxi regulations has 
always been, and continues to be, at the local level.73 The regulatory model for limousine 
and car services, on the other hand, varies from state to state.74 Many states preempt 
municipal regulation of limousines.75 For example, Washington state law regulates 
limousine licenses, insurance requirements, vehicle inspections, and training 
requirements.76 
C. Regulatory Concerns with TNCs 
Some of the major concerns with TNCs include the minimal—or complete lack of—
requirements in relation to: driver backgrounds, commercial driver’s licenses, proper 
                                                          
 63. See infra notes 64-71. 
 64. See S.F., CAL., TRANSP. CODE § 1124(b)(1); see also How to Uber, UBER (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), 
https://www.uber.com/features. 
 65. See S.F. LIMO (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.sanfranciscolimo.com/fleet.htm 
#sedans_stretch_limos. 
 66. See Angela Brown, How to Hail a Cab in New York, USA TODAY (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://traveltips.usatoday.com/hail-cab-new-york-15073.html; see also S.F. LIMO (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.sanfranciscolimo.com. 
 67. See SIDECAR, supra note 11. 
 68. See CHECKER TAXI CHI. (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), http://checkertaxichicago.com/contact-us-2; see also 
LUXOR CAB (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.luxorcab.com/luxor-history. 
 69. See BLACK DIAMOND LIMO PARTY BUS OKC (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.okclimousineservice.com; see also ELITE CHICAGO LIMO (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.elitechicagolimo.com; EXECUCAR (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.execucar.com; S.F. LIMO, 
supra note 65. 
 70. Cities We’re in, LYFT (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.lyft.com/cities; Our Cities, UBER (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.uber.com/cities. 
 71. Business Insider compared Uber rates to taxicab rates in cities throughout the country, finding that Uber 
is 1.5 times cheaper in Chicago, 1.4 times cheaper in San Francisco, and 1.1 times cheaper in Dallas; this excludes 
“surge pricing,” when TNC rates are exceptionally high. We Did the Math: Is Uber Really Better Than A Taxi?, 
BUS. INSIDER (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-versus-taxi-best-deal-cheaper-
2014-10. 
 72. See infra notes 73-76. 
 73. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ch. 52, § 52-01; see also California PUC Basic Information, supra note 56 at 11. 
 74. See COLO. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N R. 723-6-6200, at 3 (2014); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 308-83-100. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 308-83. 
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vehicle permits, vehicle inspections, and liability insurance.77 Notably, TNCs have 
developed internal regulations that cover some of these areas.78 
As with many jobs, TNCs have requirements that individuals must satisfy before 
becoming a driver for that TNC.79 Lyft, for example, requires that drivers be at least 
twenty-one years of age, pass a criminal background check, and have no greater than three 
moving traffic violations in the three years prior to their application.80 Further, Lyft 
inspects any potential vehicle a driver plans to drive under the Lyft name.81 
Uber states that its drivers must pass a criminal background check and notes that its 
drivers are subject to constant passenger reviews.82 As for vehicle safety, Uber asserts that 
it only allows “safe, high-quality vehicles that are in exceptional condition.”83 Uber does 
not allow models older than 2000, and the average model year for in-service vehicles is 
2008.84 Like its peers, Sidecar also subjects potential drivers to criminal background 
checks and relies on passenger reviews as indicators of dangerous drivers.85 
Insurance continues to be a popular topic in the discussion surrounding TNC 
regulations.86 As governments implement more insurance regulations for TNCs, TNCs 
implement more insurance coverage internally.87 Uber, for example, offers $1 million in 
commercial insurance coverage for both driver liability and underinsured or uninsured 
third parties.88 Following the tragic New Year’s Eve accident that took Sofia Liu’s life, 
Uber attempted to improve the so-called “insurance gap” by adding contingent coverage 
in excess of the driver’s personal insurance coverage when the driver’s app is on and there 
is no passenger in the vehicle.89 This contingent coverage includes $50,000 for individual 
injury, $100,000 for total injury, and $25,000 in property damage.90 Uber acknowledges 
                                                          
 77. See Anna Gallegos, The Four Biggest Legal Problems Facing Uber, Lyft and Other Ridesharing Services, 
LEXBLOG NETWORK (June 4, 2014), http://www.lxbn.com/2014/06/04/top-legal-problems-facing-uber-lyft-
ridesharing-services. 
 78. See infra notes 79-85. 
 79. See Safety, LYFT (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.lyft.com/safety; see also Safety, SIDECAR (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.side.cr/safety; see also Safety, UBER (last visited Jan. 6, 2016), 
https://www.uber.com/safety. 
 80. Safety, LYFT, supra note 79. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Following a TNC ride, passengers complete a review of their experience and the driver’s performance 
via the app; each driver’s rating is visible to other passengers. Safety, UBER, supra note 79. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. Uber recently lowered its standards for vehicles. The company previously used a rolling ten-year 
window to determine which vehicles could and could not qualify as Uber vehicles. Under the old requirement, 
for example, vehicles made in 2005 or before could not be used as Uber vehicles in 2016. Conversely, the new 
standard significantly lowers the requirement to allow any vehicle made in 2000 or later to operate as an Uber 
vehicle—completely eliminating the rolling standard. Some believe Uber made this change in order attract more 
drivers, thereby lowering rates for customers. Uber Lowers Car Requirement to 2000 or Lower, RIDESHARE 
DASHBOARD (Feb. 25, 2015), http://ridesharedashboard.com/2015/02/25/uber-lowers-car-requirement-2000-
newer/#disqus_thread. 
 85. Safety, SIDECAR, supra note 79. 
 86. Justin Sullivan, Proposed Insurance Rules Bad for Ridesharing Companies’ Bottom Line, S. CAL. PUB. 
RADIO (July 9, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/blogs/economy/2014/07/09/16986/ proposed-insurance-rules-bad-
for-ridesharing-compa. 
 87. See supra note 79. 
 88. Eliminating Ridesharing Insurance Ambiguity, UBER (Mar. 14, 2014), 
https://blog.uber.com/uberXridesharinginsurance. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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the ambiguities in relation to personal insurance coverage in these types of situations, such 
as whether a driver’s personal insurance will cover an accident that takes place when a 
driver is logged into the Uber app.91 
Lyft provides $1 million in coverage from the time a driver accepts a ride to the time 
the driver drops the passenger off at their destination and provides “insurance gap” 
coverage similar to that of Uber.92 Sidecar, conversely, only provides $1 million in 
coverage for rides from start to end, with the exception of jurisdictions with an “insurance-
gap” requirement.93 
Though many of these internal regulations mirror or exceed city taxi regulations, 
critics worry that the lack of laws regulating TNCs grant TNCs too much flexibility to 
adapt their internal regulations as they see fit—an option not available to taxi companies.94 
Despite internal regulations, TNC competitors and critics argue that TNC regulations must 
exist at a municipal or state level in order to ensure public safety and sound business 
practices.95 
Conversely, TNCs counter that some regulations may encourage fraud.96 The 
General Counsel for Sidecar, for example, argues that regulations for the “insurance gap” 
could result in drivers claiming that their app was active at the time of the accident even if 
it was not.97 Lyft argues that a driver could potentially forget to log out of the Lyft app, 
yet still be covered under Lyft’s insurance in the case of an accident.98 
Although cities and states attempt to regulate this area of transportation, 
governments struggle with finding the best way to balance public safety with the business 
interests of TNCs and other for-hire services.99 Moreover, legislators struggle with the 
best level at which to regulate TNCs: the federal level, the state level, or the local level.100 
D. Existing State TNC Regulation: California and Colorado 
Although various states have considered state regulation, only a handful of states 
have enacted TNC regulation at the state level.101 California became the first state to 
regulate TNCs at the state level in 2013 through the California Public Utilities Commission 
(the California PUC).102 
                                                          
 91. Id. 
 92. Safety, LYFT, supra 79. 
 93. Safety, SIDECAR, supra note 79. 
 94. See Michelle Ye He Lee, Ride-Share Debate Continues in, Beyond Arizona, ARIZ. CENT. (May 27, 2014, 
9:57 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2014/05/23/arizona-ride-share-debate-
continues/9527433. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Jon Brooks, Once Friendly Territory, California Looks to Toughen Rules for Uber, Lyft, KQED NEWS 
(June 17, 2014), http://ww2.kqed.org/news/06/17/2014/Uber-Lyft-Insurance-crack-down. 
 97. Don Jergler, TNCs, Insurers Square Off at California Hearing, INS. J. (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2014/03/21/324004.htm. 
 98. Brooks, supra note 96. 
 99. Jeffrey Brewer, Legislation Superhighway, NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 2014, at 62. 
 100. Ye He Lee, supra note 93; compare California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, and S.B. 14-125, 
69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014) (regulating TNCs at the state level) with AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 
13-2, art. 4 (2016), and CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-115 (2014) (regulating TNCs at the local level). 
 101. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5; Colo. S.B. 14-125; H.B. 237, 131st Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015); H.B. 1614, Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015). 
 102. Jeffrey Brewer, supra note 99, at 63. 
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1. California Regulations 
As the home state of many TNCs, California struggled with balancing taxi and TNC 
interests.103 In 2012, California sent cease and desist letters to TNCs, arguing that TNCs 
were in violation of the law because they operated without licenses.104 The state eventually 
agreed to interim TNC operations pending state regulations.105 
When attempting to resolve the various issues facing the state and its municipalities, 
both TNCs and TNC competitors engaged in the conversation.106 The state’s regulations 
for TNCs passed unanimously in 2013.107 TNCs generally welcomed the regulations, 
particularly as an alternative to cease and desist letters.108 
During the rulemaking process, Uber argued that, based on existing rules and 
definitions under the California Public Utility Code, the California PUC did not have 
jurisdiction to implement statewide regulations for TNCs.109 The California PUC rebutted 
Uber’s argument, explaining that just because TNCs “[do] not fit neatly into the 
conventional understandings of either taxis or limousines . . . does not mean that [the] 
Commission’s responsibility to public safety in the transportation industry should be 
ignored.”110 After the California PUC created the new TNC category, it determined that 
TNCs qualify as charter-party carrier services.111 The California PUC further reasoned 
that TNCs do not fit the statutory exemption for ridesharing in California.112 It went on to 
explain that the California PUC adopts rules that allow flexibility for innovation in a 
particular category.113 
California’s TNC regulations themselves do not vary significantly from many of the 
internal regulations previously discussed.114 The California regulations place emphasis on 
driver and passenger safety, requiring that TNC drivers satisfy various requirements before 
a TNC can accept them as a driver.115 First, TNC drivers must be at least twenty-one years 
                                                          
 103. California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5. 
 104. See Notice to Cease and Desist from the Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n to Sidecar (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/03851232-DD84-47C1-B134-
D90C8D15D3B7/0/CeaseandDesistLetters.pdf. 
 105. Carrier Investigations, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (last visited Mar. 7, 2015), 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/transportation/Passengers/CarrierInvestigations. 
 106. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, at 8-11. 
 107. Sudhin Thanawala, California’s New Car Sharing Regulations Create a New Category for Businesses 
Like Lyft, Uber, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2013, 7:39 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/19/california-car-sharing-regulations_n_3957177.html. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, at 9. 
 110. Id. at 12. 
 111. Id. at 51. The California Public Utilities Code defines a charter-party service as “every person engaged 
in the transportation of persons by motor vehicle for compensation, whether in common or in contract carriage, 
over any public highway in this state.” CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5360 (West 1961). 
 112. California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, at 40. Section 5353(h) of the California Public Utilities 
Code exempts ridesharing from Commission regulation “when the ridesharing is incidental to another purpose 
of the driver.” CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5353(h) (emphasis added). 
 113. California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, at 62. 
 114. Compare California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, with Safety, LYFT, supra note 79 and Safety, 
SIDECAR, supra note 79, and Safety, UBER, supra note 79. 
 115. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5. 
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old.116 TNCs must conduct criminal background checks on drivers as well.117 If a criminal 
background check reveals that the driver has convictions of the specific crimes listed in 
the regulations—including driving under the influence, sexual offenses, and theft—within 
seven years of the driver’s application, the TNC cannot hire the individual.118 A driver 
must provide their driving record to the TNC as well, and the TNC cannot hire the 
individual if they have any of the specific offenses in the regulations on their record.119 
Once an individual becomes a TNC driver, the TNC must have a “zero-tolerance policy” 
against driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.120 Although California does not 
require that a TNC hold a commercial license, the driver must hold a valid California 
driver’s license and complete a specified driving program.121 Further, the California PUC 
places restrictions on the vehicles themselves, including the requirement that vehicles be 
“street-legal.”122 Vehicles must pass initial and annual inspections with a facility licensed 
by the California Bureau of Automotive Repair as well.123 
The companies themselves also face safety requirements and regulations.124 TNCs, 
for example, must receive a permit from the California PUC in order to legally operate in 
the state.125 Moreover, companies must equip all vehicles with “dress,” or something that 
shows passengers and city or state officials that the vehicle operates as a TNC vehicle.126 
California also regulates the TNC apps themselves, requiring that apps provide passengers 
with a photo of the driver, a photo of the driver’s vehicle, and the vehicle’s license plate 
number.127 As for insurance, TNCs must have “commercial liability insurance policies 
providing not less than [$1 million] per incident coverage for incidents involving vehicles 
and drivers while they are providing TNC services.”128 Beginning July 1, 2015, TNCs 
must also comply with certain insurance requirements during the “insurance gap.”129 
2. Colorado Regulations 
Colorado became the first state to legislate statewide TNC regulation in 2014.130 
Although taxi companies argued for TNC regulations similar to those for taxi companies, 
                                                          
 116. Id. at 27. 
 117. Id. at 26. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 27. 
 120. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, at 26. 
 121. Id. at 27. 
 122. Id. at 28. 
 123. Id. at 40. 
 124. Id. at 26-29. 
 125. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, at 3. 
 126. Id. at 31. 
 127. Id. at 28. 
 128. Id. at 26. 
 129. In Decision 14-11-043, the California PUC delineated the insurance requirements for three different time 
periods: (1) when the driver has the app open and is waiting to accept a passenger; (2) when the driver accepts a 
passenger, but has not yet picked the individual up; and (3) when the driver has the passenger in the vehicle. For 
the first time period, California requires that a TNC provide insurance coverage of: $50,000 for death and 
personal injury per person, $100,000 for death and personal injury per accident, and $30,000 for property damage. 
TNCs may satisfy this requirement through the TNC’s own insurance coverage, through a driver’s verified 
insurance coverage, or through a combination of both. Moreover, TNCs must also provide excess insurance 
coverage of at least $200,000 per occurrence. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N R. 14-11-043 (2014). 
 130. Colo. S.B. 14-125. 
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Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper stated that, “rules designed to protect consumers 
should not burden businesses with unnecessary red tape or stifle competition by creating 
barriers to entry.”131 Governor Hickenlooper signed Senate Bill 14-125 on June 5, 2014, 
authorizing the operation of TNCs through the Colorado Public Utilities Commission 
(Colorado PUC).132 
Colorado places less stringent requirements on TNCs than many local TNC 
regulations across the United States.133 The bill requires that TNCs obtain a valid driver’s 
license, insurance verification, vehicle registration, and some form of criminal history for 
each potential driver.134 Further, unlike California, drivers do not have to complete a 
training program.135 Colorado TNC vehicles, however, must pass a yearly inspection 
conducted by a certified mechanic.136 Although some criticize Colorado’s less 
burdensome regulations for TNCs compared to taxi regulations, Colorado Governor John 
Hickenlooper took pride in the state’s ability to simultaneously promote both public safety 
and innovation.137 
Each TNC operating in Colorado must obtain a permit from the state in order to 
lawfully operate in the city, and pay an annual $11,250 fee to maintain the permit.138 
Colorado requires that TNCs obtain coverage of at least $1 million for incidents occurring 
when a passenger is inside the vehicle.139 Notably, Colorado requires contingent coverage 
during the “insurance gap.”140 Beginning January 15, 2015, Colorado doubled the 
contingent coverage requirements for TNCs.141 
The Colorado PUC adopted permanent TNC rules in 2015.142 These rules require 
that 
[a] TNC shall not permit a person to act as a driver unless the person is 
at least twenty-one years of age; has a valid driver’s license; is medically 
qualified to drive as required by [Colorado law]; and is not disqualified 
to drive based on . . . driving history . . . or criminal history.143 
 
                                                          
 131. Andy Vuong, Colorado First to Authorize Lyft and Uber’s Ridesharing Services, DENVER POST (June 5, 
2014, 5:06 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_25907057/colorado-first-authorize-lyft-and-ubers-
ridesharing-services?source=infinite. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Compare Colo. S.B. 14-125 and Transportation Network Company Rules, 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-6 
(2015), with AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-2, art. 4 (2016), and CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-115 (2014). 
 134. Colo. S.B. 14-125 § 40-10.1-605(1)(d), (3)(a)(I). 
 135. Compare California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, at 27, with Colo. S.B. 14-125, and 4 COLO. 
CODE REGS. § 723-6 (2015). 
 136. Colo. S.B. 14-125 § 40-10.1-605(1)(g)(I). 
 137. Vuong, supra note 131. 
 138. Colo. S.B. 14-125 § 40-10.1-606(2); 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-6-6701(a) (2015). 
 139. Colo. S.B. 14-125 § 40-10.1-604(2); 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-6-6702(a) (2015). 
 140. Senate Bill 14-125, Section 40-10.1-604(3)(a) allowed for a transition period in which TNCs could hold 
contingent coverage in compliance with C.R.S. § 10-4-620, requiring only $25,000 for one person per accident, 
$50,000 for all persons in one accident, and $15,000 for property damage. Colo. S.B. 14-125 § 40-10.1-604(3)(a); 
C.R.S.A. 10-4-620 (West 2003). 
 141. After January 15, 2015, TNCs must comply with section 40-10.1-604(3)(b) of Senate Bill 14-125, 
requiring $50,000 for one person per one accident, $100,00 for all persons per one accident, and $50,000 for 
property damage per accident. Colo. S.B. 14-125 § 40-10.1-604(3)(b)(II). 
 142. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-6 (2015). 
 143. Id. § 6708(a). 
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Similar to California’s laws, the Colorado PUC rules also mandate that all TNC vehicles 
have “vehicle markings,” or trade dress.144 Moreover, Colorado limits the number of 
consecutive hours a driver may offer or provide rides for a TNC.145 
Though no state agencies other than Public Utilities Commissions regulate TNCs in 
other states, another state agency did attempt to regulate TNCs in California.146 In early 
2015, the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) issued a memorandum 
explaining that TNCs, as vehicles for-hire, must register cars as commercial vehicles.147 
Prior to the DMV’s retraction of the memorandum just weeks later, many criticized the 
memorandum as overreaching and unnecessary.148 The backlash originated from the 
implications arising from the memo; not only would a TNC driver have to register the 
vehicle as a commercial vehicle, but the driver would also have to pay for commercial 
insurance.149 The DMV, in fact, later apologized for “jump[ing] the gun” without 
reviewing the issue.150 
E. Existing Local TNC Regulation: Chicago and Austin 
Numerous cities across the United States recently enacted local TNC regulations.151 
Though cities typically enact these regulations with the same underlying purposes of safety 
and fairness, cities use different regulatory models to accomplish these purposes.152 
Chicago and Austin—each using different regulatory models—are among the numerous 
cities to draft solutions to the TNC regulatory issues.153 
1. Chicago Regulations 
Chicago’s resolution involves two classes of TNC licenses.154 Each TNC falls into 
a class, and each TNC must satisfy the regulations imposed on that class.155 The first class, 
Class A, includes TNCs averaging twenty or less hours behind the wheel per driver per 
week.156 Class A TNCs must have the city’s approval on background checks, drug testing, 
                                                          
 144. Id. § 6719. 
 145. Id. § 6722. 
 146. Jeremy B. White, Regulation of Uber, Lyft Thrown into Question by California DMV, SACRAMENTO BEE 
(Jan. 23, 2015, 11:02 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article8004855.html. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Aaron Mamiit, Cold Feet? California DMV Retracts Decision that Uber and Lyft Need Commercial 
Plates, TECH TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/ 28608/20150126/cold-feet-
california-dmv-retracts-decision-that-uber-and-lyft-need-commercial-plates.htm. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-115 (2014); see also AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-2, art. 4 (2016); see 
also Tom Benning, Dallas Adopts Rules Governing Uber and Other Car-For-Hire Apps, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS (Dec. 10, 2014, 11:29 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/transportation/ 20141210-dallas-adopts-
rules-governing-uber-and-other-car-for-hire-apps.ece; Taylor Nachtigal, Minneapolis Gives Ride-Sharing the 
Green Light, MINN. DAILY (July 23, 2014), http://www.mndaily.com/news/metro-state/2014/07/22/minneapolis-
gives-ride-sharing-green-light. 
 152. Id. 
 153. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-115 (2014); AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-2, art. 4 (2016). 
 154. Id. ch. 9-115-030. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. ch. 9-115-030(a)(1). 
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vehicle inspection, and driver training procedures.157 Class A TNCs must also pay 
$10,000 to obtain and maintain a company license to operate as a TNC in Chicago.158 
The other class, Class B, places more stringent requirements on TNCs averaging 
more than twenty hours behind the wheel per driver per week.159 For example, every 
single driver for a Class B TNC must obtain a chauffer’s license, similar to the chauffer’s 
license required for taxicab drivers.160 A chauffer’s license requires that drivers either hold 
a valid state driver’s license for at least three years prior to application or obtain certified 
training from the city.161 Unlike a Class A TNC’s ability to procure and carry out its own 
licensing standards and procedures, a Class B TNC must comply with the city’s 
requirements for background checks, drug testing, and vehicle inspections.162 The initial 
license fee for a Class B TNC is $25,000—$15,000 more than the fee for a Class A 
TNC.163 
2. Austin Regulations 
The Austin City Council approved TNC regulations in December 2015.164 Like 
other regulations, Austin’s regulations require that TNCs acquire an “operating authority,” 
or permit, from the city and pay certain fees in order to operate in Austin.165 Also similar 
to other regulations, Austin mandates certain driver and vehicle identifications in apps, as 
well as vehicle inspections and compliance with state statutory insurance requirements.166 
Additionally, TNC drivers in Austin must be at least twenty-one years of age, have a valid 
driver’s license, and hold current liability insurance.167 TNCs must train their drivers 
through driver-training programs, and drivers cannot work as a TNC driver for more than 
twelve hours in any twenty-four hour period.168 
Austin’s regulations also impose stringent requirements on TNCs that are 
uncommon in other localities.169 For example, Austin imposes certain reporting 
requirements on TNCs.170 On a monthly basis, TNCs must report “data, recorded in four-
hour blocks,” regarding: the number of trips requested, including the number of rides 
requested but not served; the total vehicles logged into the TNC app; the number of 
passenger pick-ups and passenger drop-offs per zip code; and the total time surge pricing 
is in effect.171 On a daily basis, TNCs must also record the total number of hours logged 
by drivers and all accident reports.172 Additionally, recorded on a monthly basis, TNCs 
                                                          
 157. Id. ch. 9-115-150(b). 
 158. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-115-140(a)(i) (2014). 
 159. Id. ch. 9-115-130(a)(2); see sources cited infra notes 160-63. 
 160. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-115-150(a) (2014); see also CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-104-020 (1990). 
 161. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-104-030(2)(b) (2008). 
 162. Id. ch. 9-115-150. 
 163. Id. ch. 9-115-040(a)(ii). 
 164. AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-2, art. 4 (2016). 
 165. Id. §§ 13-2-511, -532. 
 166. Id. §§ 13-2-515, -521, -524. 
 167. Id. § 13-2-526. 
 168. Id. §§ 13-2-528(A), -529. 
 169. Compare AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-2, art. 4 (2016), with CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-115 (2014). 
 170. AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-2, art. 4, § 13-2-516 (2016). 
 171. Id. § 13-2-516(B). 
 172. Id. § 13-2-516(C), (E). 
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must report information regarding the total number of receipts generated by the TNC that 
month, the total number of trips that month, and the “total hours and miles driven by 
compliant drivers and for all drivers.”173 Should a TNC fail to report this information at 
any point, the city automatically suspends the TNC’s operating permit.174 Austin also has 
unique regulations regarding “geo-fencing,” requiring that TNCs work with the city and 
event sponsors “during large special events . . . to identify and use geo-fence pick-up and 
drop-off locations, as determined by the director to promote a safe and transportation 
efficient event.”175 
Of great concern to TNCs, Austin requires that, before allowing any individual to 
drive, TNCs ensure drivers pass both a driving history check and a fingerprint background 
check.176 Although driving history and criminal background checks are common, few 
jurisdictions require fingerprint background checks for TNCs.177 TNCs adamantly oppose 
fingerprint background check requirements, with some even threatening to halt operations 
in Austin due to the new, burdensome regulation.178 
There are various differences between TNC regulations adopted by jurisdictions 
throughout the United States.179 Further examination into federal, state, and local 
regulation of TNCs aids in evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of possible TNC 
regulatory options.180 
III. FEDERAL REGULATION 
One potential solution to TNC regulatory concerns is the imposition of regulation at 
the federal level.181 Though action has yet to be taken through the Federal Trade 
                                                          
 173. Id. § 13-2-516(D). 
 174. Id. § 13-2-516(F). 
 175. AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-2, art. 4, § 13-2-518 (2016). A geo-fence is a virtual barrier that would most 
likely track and restrict TNC vehicle movement in certain areas. This is not the first TNC regulation to involve 
geo-fencing. In an effort to exercise similar control over vehicles operating at Los Angeles International Airport, 
Los Angeles recently adopted a geo-fence regulation for TNCs operating at the airport. Jordan England-Nelson, 
Uber Taxi Car Service Corrals Drivers at LAX with “Geofence” Algorithm, DAILY BREEZE (July 5, 2014, 3:05 
PM), http://www.dailybreeze.com/technology/20140705/uber-taxi-car-service-corrals-drivers-at-lax-with-
geofence-algorithm. 
 176. AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-2, art. 4, § 13-2-527 (2016). 
 177. Compare id., with Colo. S.B. 14-125 and 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-6 (2015), and CHI., ILL., MUN. 
CODE § 9-115 (2014). 
 178. Uber and Lyft both seized operations in San Antonio in 2015 when the city’s new regulations required 
fingerprint background checks. After the Austin City Council approved new fingerprint regulations, a Lyft 
spokesperson stated that Lyft does not operate in cities with fingerprint requirements and will operate in Austin 
only until such requirements go into effect. Ben Wear, What’s Next for Uber, Lyft and Austin’s Fingerprint Check 
Ordinance?, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN (Dec. 18, 2015, 2:24 PM), 
http://www.mystatesman.com/news/news/local/ whats-next-for-uber-lyft-and-austins-fingerprint-c/npnLg. 
 179. Compare Colo. S.B. 14-125, with 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-6 (2015), and AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-
2, art. 4 (2016), and CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-115 (2014). 
 180. See discussion infra Parts III, IV, V. 
 181. See E. Glen Weyl & Alexander White, Let the Best ‘One’ Win: Lessons from the New Economics of 
Platforms 22 (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 709); see also Marvin 
Ammori, Can the FTC Save Uber?, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/technology/ future_tense/ 2013/03/uber_lyft_sidecar_can_the_ftc_fight_local_taxi_ commissions.html; 
Brian Heaton, Cities Grapple with Regulatory Status of Ride-Sharing Companies, GOV’T TECH. (July 23, 2014), 
http://www.govtech.com/transportation/Cities -Grapple-with-Regulatory-Status-of-Ride-Sharing-
Companies.html; Eric Posner, Why Uber Will-and Should-Be Regulated, SLATE (Jan. 5, 2015, 2:49 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/ 
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Commission or through Congress, there are arguments both for and against federal 
involvement in the regulation of TNCs.182 
A. Constitutional Considerations 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power 
“to regulate commerce . . . among the several states.”183 The Supreme Court has held that 
Congress acts within its Commerce Clause power when regulating a channel of interstate 
commerce, an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or an economic activity having a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.184 
One could argue that TNCs constitute a channel of interstate commerce because 
TNCs take customers to the airport, thereby “serv[ing] interstate travelers.”185 
Alternatively, TNCs may be considered an economic activity having a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce because the nature of TNC regulation involves protecting the 
public’s safety and improving transportation markets for consumers.186 One could even 
present a successful argument that TNCs—the first major competition for taxicabs in 
decades—have a substantial effect on interstate commerce because TNCs operate 
throughout the country and completely transform for-hire transportation markets.187 
Even if Congress acts under its Commerce Clause power, the Tenth Amendment 
serves as an additional limitation on Congress’ power to regulate certain activities.188 As 
held in New York v. United States, it is unconstitutional for the federal government to 
mandate that states enact a regulatory program for TNCs.189 Rather, the government must 
preempt the field.190 
Therefore, the major constitutional question facing federal TNC regulation is 
whether TNCs constitute interstate commerce.191 TNCs may qualify as interstate 
commerce, either because TNCs serve interstate travelers or because TNCs have a 
substantial economic effect on transportation markets.192 As long as the federal 
government preempts the field, the Tenth Amendment does not present a barrier for federal 
TNC regulation.193 
                                                          
articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/01/uber_surge_pricing_federal_regulation_over_taxis_an
d_car_ride_services.html. 
 182. Id. 
 183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 184. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-
30 (1995). 
 185. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (holding that Congress acted 
within its commerce power when regulating private accommodations because a motel serves interstate travelers). 
 186. A court would likely find that this is more economic than gender motivated crime, as it directly involves 
transportation markets. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (holding that the safety of individuals from gender motivated 
crime is not an economic activity). 
 187. Id. 
 188. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 167. 
 191. See supra notes 183-86. 
 192. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964). 
 193. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 167. 
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B. Advantages of Federal TNC Regulation 
Federal regulation may benefit TNCs and for-hire customers.194 The longstanding 
relationship between taxi companies and local governments potentially threatens the 
success of innovative business models like TNCs.195 The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) released a report in 1984 concerning taxicab regulation.196 The report examines the 
economics of taxicab regulation, including the reason behind the high fares for taxicab 
customers.197 The FTC blames local government regulations for the lack of competition, 
and therefore, lack of lower fares.198 Thus, keeping TNC regulation at the same level as 
taxi regulation could create much bigger issues than an uneven playing field; it could harm 
innovation while simultaneously subjecting the public to high fares.199 E. Glen Weyl, an 
economics researcher at Microsoft, and Alexander White, an economics professor and 
researcher in China, believe that “[r]egulation from a higher level, . . . charged with 
ensuring that the platform competition and conduct maximizes social welfare seems more 
appropriate.”200 
There are also economic reasons for federal regulation, which can be demonstrated 
by examining the effects of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on the wireless phone 
industry and its customers.201 Thomas W. Hazlett, a former Chief Economist of the 
Federal Communications Commission, currently serves as a professor of law and 
economics at George Mason University School of Law.202 Hazlett believes that the federal 
preemption of wireless phone regulations greatly increased the efficiency of the 
industry.203 Increased efficiency created benefits for both wireless phone customers and 
wireless phone companies.204 
Hazlett notes that, “conflicting rules and regulations can clog the wheels of 
commerce, introducing inefficiencies that lower consumer welfare.”205 He believes that 
federal preemption kept the rates of the wireless phone industry from rising.206 Before 
preemption, the states with regulations for wireless phone companies had higher rates than 
the states without regulation.207 The rates in regulated states, as well as unregulated states, 
did not “shoot up” following federal regulation—something that Hazlett believes would 
                                                          
 194. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Federal Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
113 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds., 2007) [hereinafter Federal Preemption]. 
 195. See BUREAU OF ECON. STAFF REP., AN ECON. ANALYSIS OF TAXICAB REGULATION (1984) [hereinafter 
ECON. ANALYSIS OF TAXICAB REGULATION] (exemplifying the close relationships between taxi companies and 
local governments), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/reports/economic-analysis-
taxicab-regulation/233832.pdf; see also Ammori, supra note 181. 
 196. ECON. ANALYSIS OF TAXICAB REGULATION, supra note 195. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Weyl, supra note 181, at 22. 
 200. Id. at 23 (emphasis omitted); E. GLEN WEYL (last visited Mar. 8, 2015), http://glenweyl.com/biography; 
ALEXANDER WHITE (last visited Mar. 8, 2015), http://alex-white.net. 
 201. Federal Preemption, supra note 194, at 133-34. 
 202. Thomas W. Hazlett, GEORGE MASON UNIV. (last visited Mar. 10, 2015), http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett. 
 203. Federal Preemption, supra note 194, at 133. 
 204. Id. at 133-34. 
 205. Id. at 116. 
 206. Id. at 133. 
 207. Id. 
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have happened had states continued regulating the industry.208 
Federal regulation benefited wireless phone companies in many ways, including 
increased benefits of national advertising.209 Differing advertising regulations across state 
lines discourage companies from participating in nationwide advertising and, therefore, 
constrain the efficiency of partaking in a national advertising campaign rather than 
multiple, local advertising campaigns.210 
Hazlett blames differing regulations among state and local governments, much like 
the regulations currently in effect for TNCs, for the inefficiency of decentralized 
markets.211 The similarities between the wireless phone industry in the mid-1990s and the 
TNC industry today suggest that federal regulation may create more benefits for customers 
and TNCs than the decentralized regulation that currently exists.212 
C. Disadvantages of Federal TNC Regulation 
Although TNCs vary enough from taxi companies to warrant a different regulatory 
model, the federal government may not be the best regulatory option for TNCs.213 Dave 
Sutton is a spokesperson for the Taxicab, Limousine, and Paratransit Association.214 
Sutton believes that the reason local governments regulate taxicabs is because the 
transportation industry is very different from one city to the next.215 Factors including the 
size of a city, the number of households without cars, and the number of airport taxi trips 
determine the nature of the local taxi industry.216 As these factors differ from city to city, 
taxi regulations also differ from city to city in order to accommodate the local 
transportation industry.217 TNC regulations may need to differ from city to city as well.218 
Thus, federal regulations may be too removed from local issues to adequately solve 
those issues.219 Eric Posner, a University of Chicago law professor, challenges Weyl and 
White on the effectiveness of federal regulation, noting that “[t]he federal government is 
not always good at regulating local activities.”220 Additionally, Posner suggests that 
TNCs, as national companies, could be in a position to have the same “cozy” relationship 
with the federal government that taxi companies have with local governments.221 
D. Method of Federal Regulation 
Arguments concerning federal TNC regulation include the consideration of federal 
                                                          
 208. Federal Preemption, supra note 194, at 133. 
 209. Id. at 133-34. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 116, 133-34. 
 212. See Federal Preemption, supra note 194; Ammori, supra note 181. 
 213. Heaton, supra note 181; see also Posner, supra note 181. 
 214. Heaton, supra note 181; see also Posner, supra note 181. 
 215. Heaton, supra note 181; see also Posner, supra note 181. 
 216. See Bruce Schaller, A Regression Model of the Number of Taxicabs in U.S. Cities (Jan. 2005) (examining 
the differences among local taxi industries in order to suggest more effective regulation). 
 217. Compare N.Y.C., N.Y., ch. 54 with S.F., CAL., TRANSP. CODE § 1103; see also Heaton, supra note 181. 
 218. Heaton, supra note 181. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Posner, supra note 181; Posner, UNIV. OF CHI. (last visited Mar. 8, 2015), 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e. 
 221. Posner, supra note 181. 
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involvement in taxi regulation.222 Some use this as an argument against federal regulation 
of TNCs, insisting the importance of an even playing field for taxi companies.223 Others 
use the federal government’s lack of involvement in taxi regulation to support the 
argument that TNC regulation should take place at a higher level of government than state 
or local levels.224 If federal regulation could, in fact, protect TNCs from taxi-favoring 
local governments, the question turns to the type of regulation that should exist at the 
federal level.225 
1. The Federal Trade Commission 
Scholar and lawyer Marvin Ammori believes that the FTC is a plausible solution to 
TNC regulatory issues.226 After the 1984 FTC report’s conclusions on local taxi regulation 
practices, the FTC filed suit against two local governments for “colluding with private taxi 
companies.”227 Though that report and the subsequent lawsuits took place thirty years ago, 
the FTC’s comments in the years since hint at support of the innovation and competition 
introduced through TNCs.228 Not only has the FTC explained that taxi companies still face 
little competition, but the FTC noted that technological advances could promote necessary 
competition for taxi companies.229 Further, the FTC sent a letter to the D.C. Taxicab 
Commission in 2013, suggesting changes to proposed rules that would affect TNCs.230 In 
the letter, the FTC advocated for TNCs, stating that “[TNC] technologies and methods 
may be more responsive to consumer demand, may promote a more efficient allocation of 
resources to consumers, may expand demand for passenger vehicle transportation services, 
and may reduce consumers’ transaction costs in paying for such services.”231 
The FTC’s support of TNCs’ innovative competition with the long-uncompetitive 
taxi industry suggests that the FTC may be willing to protect TNCs through federal 
regulation.232 Ammori notes that the FTC has both the authority to regulate TNCs and the 
necessary “expertise in taxi markets and antitrust doctrines.”233 As Ammori sees it, the 
ultimate issue rests with whether individual states choose to regulate taxicab 
competition.234 Antitrust law allows a state to preempt the FTC if the state “clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed” a policy to maintain an anticompetitive market to 
                                                          
 222. See Weyl, supra note 181; see also Ammori, supra note 181; Heaton, supra note 181; Posner, supra note 
181. 
 223. Heaton, supra note 181; Posner, supra note 181. 
 224. Weyl, supra note 181, at 22-23; Ammori, supra note 181. 
 225. Ammori, supra note 181. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Stephanie Francis Ward, App Me a Ride, 100 A.B.A. J. 13 (2014); Letter from F.T.C. to Jacque P. Lerner, 
General Counsel of the District of Columbia Taxicab Commission (June 7, 2013) [hereinafter Letter from F.T.C. 
to D.C. Taxi Commission], http://www.taxi-library.org/ftc-letter-to-dctc-june-2013.pdf; Ammori, supra note 
181. 
 229. “In 2007, two decades after those cases settled, the FTC noted that the taxi industry remained largely 
uncompetitive . . . [but] ‘telecommunications advances’ might help to disrupt [the] uncompetitive markets.” 
Ammori, supra note 181. 
 230. Letter from F.T.C. to D.C. Taxi Commission, supra note 228. 
 231. Id. at 3. 
 232. See Letter from F.T.C. to D.C. Taxi Commission, supra note 228; see also Ammori, supra note 181. 
 233. Ammori, supra note 181. 
 234. Id. 
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protect state business.235 Therefore, states could protect taxi companies from increased 
and regulated competition if they chose to favor their business and limit innovative 
competition.236 
2. Congressional Legislation 
Marvin Ammori also notes the viability of congressional legislation as a solution to 
this issue.237 Congressional legislation regulating TNCs would preempt any state or local 
regulation.238 Although some may be critical of “one sentence” legislation preventing the 
state and local governments from regulating TNCs, Ammori notes that Congress passed 
such a law with the Telecommunications Act of 1996.239 Ammori also believes that such 
legislation is “politically feasible,” as both political parties “can agree that more choices 
and lower prices in transportation would benefit customers.”240 
IV. STATE REGULATION 
State regulation represents another solution to TNC regulatory concerns.241 Unlike 
federal regulation, state TNC regulation currently exists, and additional states continue to 
consider statewide TNC regulation as well.242 
A. Constitutional Considerations 
The Dormant Commerce Clause derives from Congress’ Commerce Clause power, 
and acts as a limitation to state and local regulatory power when conflicting federal 
regulation does not exist.243 The primary consideration in any Dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis is whether the regulation discriminates against out-of-staters on its face, in its 
purpose, or in its effect.244 The majority of state TNC regulations do not discriminate 
against out-of-state TNCs in any way, as the regulations apply the same licensing, 
inspection, and operation requirements to all TNCs, regardless of the company’s state of 
incorporation or primary place of business.245 
If a regulation does not discriminate against out-of-staters, the regulation is 
presumed constitutional unless it imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is “clearly 
excessive in relation to putative local benefits.”246 A court would likely hold that state 
TNC regulations do not burden interstate commerce because the benefit of improved, 
efficient TNC relations and public safety throughout the United States outweighs any 
                                                          
 235. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light, Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1985); see also Ammori, supra note 181. 
 236. Ammori, supra note 181. 
 237. Id. 
 238. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 239. Ammori, supra note 181. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5; Colo. S.B. 14-125; Ohio H.B. 237; Okla. H.B. 
1614. 
 242. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5; Colo. S.B. 14-125; Ohio H.B. 237; Okla. H.B. 
1614; Brewer, supra note 99, at 63. 
 243. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5; Colo. S.B. 14-125. 
 246. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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burdens.247 
However, there may be a Dormant Commerce Clause issue with California’s 
requirement that TNC drivers hold a valid California driver’s license because such a 
regulation discriminates against those individuals holding out-of-state driver’s licenses.248 
While there are two exceptions to the Dormant Commerce Clause, neither exception 
applies to this regulation.249 Therefore, to prevent constitutional challenges, states should 
consider excluding the requirement that TNC drivers hold in-state driver’s licenses.250 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution acts as another limitation 
to state regulation.251 It entitles individuals “to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens 
of the several States.”252 The majority of state TNC regulations, like license and fee 
requirements, do not present a Privileges and Immunities Clause issue because those 
regulations treat in-state and out-of-state TNCs identically.253 
However, like the Dormant Commerce Clause, there is a Privileges and Immunities 
Clause issue with California’s requirement that TNC drivers hold a valid California 
driver’s license.254 The first question in a Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis is 
whether the regulation discriminates against out-of-staters.255 This regulation does 
discriminate against out-of-state individuals because only citizens of California benefit 
from the regulation.256 The second consideration in this analysis is whether the regulation 
burdens a fundamental right.257 In United Building Construction v. Camden, the Supreme 
Court held a local regulation, requiring that construction workers be residents of the city, 
unconstitutional because it burdened the fundamental right of pursuing an occupation; a 
court may hold that California’s in-state driver’s license requirement burdens that same 
fundamental right.258 Lastly, a Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis asks whether 
the state has a substantial reason for the differing treatment.259 Similar to the argument 
made in the case of Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, California would likely 
argue that it wants drivers to be familiar with the state and its laws for safety reasons.260 
                                                          
 247. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (holding a nondiscriminatory statute 
requiring paper milk cartons constitutional because the benefits of improving the environment and proper 
disposal outweighed the few burdens that it created). 
 248. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5. See Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 
(1951) (holding that a discriminatory statute requiring milk sold in the city of Madison be inspected within a 
certain radius of the city was unconstitutional). 
 249. The first exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause is congressional approval, or if congress acted and 
made the action legal. W.S. Life Ins. Co. v. St. Bd. Cal., 451 U.S. 648 (1981). Another exception to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause is the Market Participant Exception, where the state acts as a participant in the market. Reeves 
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). 
 250. See generally Dean Milk, 340 U.S. 349. 
 251. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5. 
 254. See infra notes 255-61. 
 255. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 214-22 (1984). 
 256. Id.; California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5. 
 257. United Bldg. & Constr., 465 U.S. at 218. 
 258. Id. at 208. 
 259. Id. at 222. 
 260. In Piper, a resident of Vermont brought suit against the New Hampshire Supreme Court, challenging the 
state’s residency requirement for admission to the New Hampshire bar. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 
U.S. 274, 285 (1985). 
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However, similar to the Supreme Court’s holding in Piper, a court may hold that out-of-
state drivers would commit themselves to safety in the state and, additionally, that in-state 
drivers prevent similar safety risks to the public.261 
Although there do not seem to be any Dormant Commerce Clause or Privileges and 
Immunities Clause issues with state TNC regulations in general, the specific California 
requirement pertaining to licenses presents issues as to both clauses.262 Therefore, in order 
to be constitutional, states should consider enacting regulations without such 
discriminatory requirements.263 
B. Advantages of State TNC Regulation 
Diverse TNC regulations throughout the United States can benefit the industry over 
time.264 This is also known as the “laboratories” argument; regulation in fifty states means 
experimentation in regulating TNCs throughout the country.265 Experimentation allows 
for creativity in finding effective regulations.266 Additionally, state regulation, unlike 
federal regulation, often leads to feedback regarding the effectiveness of different 
regulations implemented in states throughout the country.267 
Similar to federal regulation, allowing states to self-regulate circumvents the 
anticompetitive practices of municipal governments.268 State regulation, therefore, 
protects both TNCs and consumers.269 It enacts regulations that address TNC concerns, 
rather than forcing TNCs to comply with regulations for the taxi industry’s outdated and 
overregulated business model or regulations aimed at protecting taxicab companies.270 
Such regulation also protects consumers from an anticompetitive, overpriced taxi industry 
by promoting innovation and allowing consumers options in getting from one place to the 
next.271 Moreover, state regulation encourages safe TNC operations in smaller cities or 
towns, thereby widening transportation options for consumers in places without any for-
hire service options.272 
Disadvantages of State TNC Regulation 
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of state TNC regulation is the effect of varying 
                                                          
 261. The Supreme Court in Piper ruled that New Hampshire’s residency requirement for admission to the bar 
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution, explaining that there was no 
merit to the arguments that an out-of-state resident would be less likely to be knowledgeable of local rules and 
procedures, practice honestly, and complete their share of pro bono work. Id. at 284-88. 
 262. See the discussion supra notes 243-61 regarding the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Federal Preemption, supra note 194, at 116. 
 265. See Gabrielle Cuskelly, Factors to Consider in Applying a Presumption Against Preemption to State 
Environmental Regulations, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 283, 306 (2012). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Federal Preemption, supra note 194, at 116; Cuskelly, supra note 265, at 306. 
 268. Cf. Ammori, supra note 181. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See sources cited supra notes 264-68. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Uber briefly asserted this position in a petition for legislatures to adopt statewide TNC regulation in 
Oklahoma. Vote Yes on HB 1614!, UBER (last visited Mar. 8, 2015), 
https://action.uber.org/ok/?utm_source=facebook. 
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state laws across the country.273 Although California and Colorado impose similar 
requirements on TNCs, there are differences between the two states’ regulations in specific 
areas.274 
For example, California regulates the contents of TNC smartphone apps, requiring 
a photo of the driver, a photo of the driver’s approved vehicle, and the vehicle’s license 
plate number.275 Colorado does not regulate the apps.276 If a TNC’s app does not comply 
with the requirements set forth by the California PUC, the TNC would likely need to 
change its entire app nationwide to comply with California’s regulations—even though 
such changes are not necessary for business operations in Colorado.277 TNCs may face 
even more issues should states impose different regulations on the same subject.278 In 
situations where adherence to differing regulations is possible, TNCs face high costs to 
comply with the conflicting requirements.279 The nature of TNC companies, as compared 
to taxis, emphasizes this disadvantage because TNCs operate throughout the United States 
and in accordance with internal, nationwide guidelines.280 
Rather than having a set of internal guidelines that provides for flexibility and 
innovation, varying requirements among states present the risk that TNCs will adopt 
requirements from the strictest state.281 This can, in effect, limit the viability of any other 
state’s promulgated rules.282 Rules among states could differ in order to adapt to localized 
issues.283 However, the purpose of regulation at a more local level evaporates when a 
company uniformly adopts another state’s stricter regulation.284 
Similar to federal regulation, state TNC regulation could be too removed from 
community needs.285 Former Illinois Governor Pat Quinn believes that state TNC 
regulation threatens local communities.286 Quinn vetoed House Bill 4075—a statewide 
TNC regulation—in 2014, emphasizing the importance of the Home Rule.287 The 
Governor released a statement explaining that he vetoed the bill “because it would have 
mandated a one-size-fits-all approach to a service that is best regulated at the local 
                                                          
 273. See Federal Preemption, supra note 194, at 116. 
 274. Compare California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, at 27 with Colo. S.B. 14-125 and 4 COLO. 
CODE REGS. § 723-6 (2015). 
 275. California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, at 28. 
 276. See Colo. S.B. 14-125; see also 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-6 (2015). 
 277. California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, at 28; see also Colo. S.B. 14-125; see also 4 COLO. 
CODE REGS. § 723-6 (2015); UBER (last visited Mar. 8, 2015), https://www.uber.com. 
 278. Federal Preemption, supra note 194, at 116. 
 279. See id. 
 280. See generally LYFT (last visited Mar. 8, 2015), https://www.lyft.com; see also SIDECAR (last visited Mar. 
8, 2015), http://www.side.cr; UBER (last visited Mar. 8, 2015), https://www.uber.com. 
 281. In order to avoid inefficiencies from decentralized regulations implanting varying rules across the United 
States, adopting the strictest regulation to comply with all regulations may be a TNC’s best option. See generally 
Federal Preemption, supra note 194, at 116. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Compare California Decision on Regulations, supra note 5, with Colo. S.B. 14-125, and 4 COLO. CODE 
REGS. § 723-6 (2015). 
 284. Federal Preemption, supra note 194, at 116. 
 285. Cf. Heaton, supra note 181; Stephanie K. Jones, Illinois Rideshare Bills Vetoed, INS. J. (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2014/08/27/338672.htm. 
 286. Jones, supra note 285. 
 287. Id. 
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level.”288 
V. LOCAL REGULATION 
Municipal regulation remains the most common form of regulation for taxi 
companies throughout the United States.289 Therefore, it is no surprise that regulation at 
the local level is the most widely adopted solution to regulating TNCs thus far.290 Chicago 
and Austin are among the names on the growing list of cities to enact local TNC 
regulations.291 
A. Preemption Considerations 
Local governments are subject to the Dormant Commerce Clause and Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, and should be cognizant of potential challenges under those 
clauses.292 It is possible that states regulate major issues, while local entities address 
smaller, localized concerns.293 When federal law does not preempt state or local law, local 
governments receive the power to regulate from the state government.294 There are two 
prevailing theories regarding the relationship between state and local regulation: Dillon’s 
Rule and the Home Rule.295 
In 1868, the Iowa Supreme Court codified state supremacy in the case City of Clinton 
v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri River Railroad Company.296 Courts across the United States 
still recognize Dillon’s Rule, as evidenced by Marcus Cable Associates v. City of Bristol, 
decided in 2002.297 In Marcus Cable, a cable television company sought an injunction 
prohibiting the city from operating competing cable television systems.298 The United 
States District Court for the Western District of West Virginia explained that, in states 
following Dillon’s Rule, cities may only exercise authority “expressly granted by state law 
or necessarily implied from express powers.”299 The court held that the city did not have 
the legal authority to operate any kind of cable television system because the state had not 
expressly or impliedly granted such legal authority.300 
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove is one of the many cases depicting the Home 
                                                          
 288. Id. 
 289. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ch. 54; see also S.F., CAL., TRANSP. CODE § 1103; Heaton, supra note 181. 
 290. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-115 (2014); see also AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-2, art. 4 (2016). 
 291. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-115 (2014); see also AUSTIN, TEX., CODE ch. 13-2, art. 4 (2016). 
 292. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 215 (1984) (explaining 
that “a municipality is merely a political subdivision of the state from which its authority derives” and is, 
therefore, still subject to the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
 293. See Marcus Cable Assoc. v. City of Bristol, 237 F. Supp. 2d 675 (W.D. Va. 2002); see also Quilici v. 
Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261(7th Cir. 1982). 
 294. See Marcus Cable Assoc. v. City of Bristol, 237 F. Supp. 2d 675 (W.D. Va. 2002); see also Quilici v. 
Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261(7th Cir. 1982). 
 295. See Marcus Cable Assoc. v. City of Bristol, 237 F. Supp. 2d 675 (W.D. Va. 2002); see also Quilici v. 
Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261(7th Cir. 1982). 
 296. Creating Dillon’s Rule, Judge Dillon held that a municipal government can only exercise powers which 
the state expressly or impliedly grants to the municipality. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Mo. River R.R. 
Co., 24 Iowa 455 (Iowa 1868). 
 297. Marcus Cable Assoc., 237 F. Supp. 2d at 676. 
 298. Id. at 677-78. 
 299. Id. at 678. 
 300. Id. at 675. 
23
O'Connor: Along for the Ride: Regulating Transportation Network Companies
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015
OCONNOR_3.3.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2016  11:28 PM 
602 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:579 
Rule.301 In Quilici, handgun owners sued a city based on a local gun control ordinance.302 
The United States Court of Appeals upheld the ordinance as constitutional under the Home 
Rule.303 The court explained that the Illinois Constitution allows for local governments to 
“‘exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and 
affairs.’”304 The idea behind this rule, as the court noted, is that local governments are in 
the best position to solve community needs.305 
States either adopt Dillon’s Rule, the Home Rule, or both.306 Colorado and 
California recognize Dillon’s Rule for all cities except charter cities, in which the Home 
Rule applies.307 Texas strictly follows Dillon’s Rule.308 Alternatively, the Home Rule is 
the prevailing rule in Illinois.309 
B. Advantages of Local TNC Regulation 
Subsidiarity, a principle of social organization, provides that regulation should be 
“at the lowest appropriate governance level.”310 Subsidiarity seeks to increase efficiency 
and decrease centralized governance through local, decentralized regulation.311 
Considering the localized differences in transportation markets, some argue that 
subsidiarity calls for TNC regulation through municipalities.312 
TNCs often attempt to categorize themselves as technology companies rather than 
companies providing taxi services.313 Although TNCs argue that their categorization as 
technology companies should separate TNC regulations from taxi regulations, others 
disagree.314 Dave Sutton disagrees with TNCs’ self-categorization as technology 
companies.315 As previously discussed, Sutton believes that TNCs should face the same 
regulations as taxi companies because TNCs, he argues, provide transportation services 
similar to those provided by taxi services.316 Due to the fact that the taxi industry is 
“‘dramatically different’ from city to city,” Sutton believes that the regulations for TNCs 
should stay at the municipal level.317 
Daniel Weinstock, a law professor at McGill University, argues that regulating at 
the local level, through subsidiarity, also promotes “democratic engagement.”318 He notes 
                                                          
 301. Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 302. Id. at 263. 
 303. Id. at 261. 
 304. Quilici, 695 F.2d 267 (citing ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a)). 
 305. Id. at 268. 
 306. Dillon’s Rule or Not?, NAT’L ASS’N OF CNTY., http://www.celdf.org/downloads/ 
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L. REV. 31 (2014). 
 311. Id. at 31. 
 312. See Heaton, supra note 181. 
 313. Id. 
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 317. Heaton, supra note 181. 
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that “[b]ringing decision-making authority over issues of local concern closer to the people 
who are directly affected by [those issues] would better realize the ‘all-affected principle’ 
[of subsidiarity] than would more centralized decision making.”319 Therefore, regulating 
at the local level could promote TNC customer involvement in the regulation process, 
perhaps increasing the effectiveness and appropriateness of the regulations themselves.320 
C. Disadvantages of Local TNC Regulation 
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of municipal regulation is the risk that 
municipalities enact regulations that discourage competition and foster anti-innovation.321 
Taxi companies historically enjoyed little competition and close relationships with the 
local governments that enacted taxi regulations.322 The highly innovative TNC business 
model, therefore, completely changed local transportation environments.323 Many cities, 
inexperienced with innovative entrants into the local transportation markets, initially 
reacted to TNCs through strict regulations or—in many instances—complete prohibitions 
on TNC operations.324 
In 2014, Seattle became the first city to place a cap on the number of vehicles that 
TNCs could operate.325 A Seattle councilwoman explained her reasoning in voting for the 
ordinance, stating that she did not “want to ‘temporarily’ kill innovation, but [did] want to 
buy a year for the taxi world to adapt.”326 In October 2013, New Orleans issued cease and 
desist letters to TNCs, asserting that TNCs failed to comply with outdated, pre-TNC 
regulations.327 Additionally, in 2013, Portland’s Private For-Hire Transportation Board of 
Review declined to amend city ordinances to include a category for TNCs, despite Uber’s 
pleas for updated regulations.328 
Though many municipalities eventually modified regulations for TNCs, TNCs 
continue to face issues stemming from taxi-favoring municipalities.329 In December 2014, 
                                                          
Fleming & Jacob T. Levy, eds., 2014); Daniel Weinstock, MCGILL UNIV. (last visited Mar. 9, 2015), 
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 319. Cities and Federalism, supra note 318, at 270. 
 320. See id. 
 321. See sources cited supra notes 195-200. 
 322. See ECON. ANALYSIS OF TAXICAB REGULATION, supra note 195; see also Ammori, supra note 181. 
 323. Letter from F.T.C. to D.C. Taxi Commission, supra note 228, at 2. 
 324. Letter from the City of New Orleans to Travis Kalanick, CEO of Uber Technologies, Inc. (Oct. 10, 2013) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from New Orleans to Uber]; Larry Downes, Uber’s Battle in Seattle 
Highlights the Irony of Regulation Hurting the Consumers it was Designed to Help, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ innovations/wp/2014/03/24/ubers-battle-in-seattle-highlights-the-irony-
of-regulation-hurting-the-consumers-it-was-designed-to-help; Reid, Seattle Becomes First City to Cap Uber, Lyft 
Vehicles, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/ wp/2014/03/18/seattle-
becomes-first-city-to-cap-uber-lyft-vehicles. 
 325. Wilson, supra note 324. 
 326. Downes, supra note 324. 
 327. See Letter from New Orleans to Uber, supra note 324. 
 328. Taylor Soper, Why Portland is Keeping Uber out of the Rose City, GEEK WIRE (Jan. 2, 2014, 9:51 AM), 
http://www.geekwire.com/2014/portland-ridesharing. 
 329. In December 2014, Portland filed suit against Uber, alleging that Uber operated illegally due to a failure 
to follow taxicab regulations. Complaint, City of Portland v. Uber Tech., Inc. (D. Or. Dec. 8, 2014). The District 
Attorneys for both Los Angeles and San Francisco also filed suit against Uber in December 2014, alleging that 
Uber calculates fares in a manner unapproved by the state and misled the public on the effectiveness of 
background checks. Complaint, California v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. CGC-14-543120 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 
2014). 
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for example, the City of Portland filed suit against Uber just days after Uber began 
operations in the city, alleging that Uber failed to comply with taxicab regulations.330 
Although cities may genuinely fear for the public’s safety when regulating or 
prohibiting TNCs, the public may not be the primary concern for some city leaders.331 
Due to the history of local politicians favoring taxi companies, some believe that cities 
regulate TNCs with the local taxi industry’s best interest in mind.332 
From July 2014 to December 31, 2014, a San Antonio Councilwoman allegedly 
accepted thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from taxi and other for-hire 
industry leaders, accounting for nearly 20 percent of her total campaign contributions.333 
Although individuals associated with TNCs did contribute money to city leaders, the 
contributions were incomparable to those from taxi companies.334 The taxi industry 
contributed at least $16,000 to San Antonio officials in 2014, while those associated with 
TNCs contributed a mere $1,400 in the same year.335 Further, the taxi industry reportedly 
contributed over $35,000 to city leaders and candidates, including a mayoral candidate, 
over the past few years.336 These contributions coincided with San Antonio’s preparations 
to enact TNC regulations.337 
Following Chicago’s approval of TNC regulations, Chicago announced a plan to 
sponsor an app for the taxi industry.338 Although the city also planned to release certain 
fee restrictions on taxi companies, the city’s plan to sponsor an industry-wide app provides 
evidence of the city’s direct involvement in advancing the taxi industry’s 
competitiveness.339 
Regulation at the local level also presents the risk of economic burdens on TNCs.340 
The risk may be even higher for local regulation because TNCs, as national companies, 
must follow the regulations of thousands of cities across the country rather than the 
regulations of only fifty states.341 
VI. STATE REGULATION: THE BEST REGULATORY OPTION FOR TNCS 
Although all three major regulatory options have advantages and disadvantages, 
                                                          
 330. Complaint, City of Portland v. Uber Tech., Inc., supra note 329. 
 331. See sources cited supra notes 195-200. 
 332. Mike Masnick, Corruption Index Indicator: Cities that Ban Ride-Sharing to Protect Taxi Incumbants, 
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http://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Taxis-give-big-cash-to-councilwoman-6021353.php. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Mark Guarino, Chicago Plans App So Uber Can Compete with Uber, Ridesharing Services, REUTERS 
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 340. Cf. Federal Preemption, supra note 194, at 116. 
 341. The 2012 Census counted a total of 38,910 general-purpose local governments. Although the number of 
local governments regulating TNCs would be far less than that, the statistic illustrates the vast difference between 
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state regulation represents a balance of the various risks and benefits associated with 
federal and local TNC regulation.342 
A. State TNC Regulation Fosters Development and Efficiency 
Both state and local regulation presents the risk that TNCs uniformly adopt the 
strictest requirement throughout the country, despite the absence of that requirement in 
other places.343 However, a TNC’s adoption of the strictest regulation may not always be 
a disadvantage.344 Colorado, for example, requires contingent coverage for the “insurance 
gap” and California does not.345 Interestingly, Uber’s internal guidelines mirror 
Colorado’s requirements, thereby protecting customers in California through Colorado’s 
stricter regulation.346 
Differing regulations across the country may, however, promote the development of 
effective TNC regulations over time.347 When regulation takes place at more regionalized 
levels, states and cities can look to other state or city regulations in order to determine 
which regulations are most effective in both maintaining safety and promoting 
innovation.348 
Federal regulations, though uniform, do not present the same opportunity for growth 
and development.349 Whereas states can learn from other states’ regulations and the impact 
those regulations have on transportation markets, the federal government has few options 
in comparable regulations.350 
Although local regulation may promote development, thousands of regulatory 
“laboratories” could create more issues than benefits, as complying with thousands of 
regulations from thousands of municipalities fosters inefficiency.351 Rather than TNCs 
facing great economic burdens under local regulation in examining thousands of 
regulations, ensuring compliance with each regulation, and staying up to date on regulatory 
changes for each municipality, state regulation prevents economic burdens by simplifying 
the number of TNC regulations.352 
B. State TNC Regulation Balances Interests 
Transportation markets, and the need for for-hire car services, differ from one city 
to the next.353 Thus, a city’s needs in TNC regulations may differ from one city to the next 
as well.354 Rulemaking at the local level may, therefore, incorporate individuals in the 
rulemaking process who are familiar with a city’s particular needs in regulating TNCs, 
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ensuring that regulations address those local issues.355 
However, a history of corruption and lack of competition illustrates cities’ frequent 
unwillingness to adopt regulations that encourage competition for taxi companies and 
encourage a better market for citizens.356 State and federal regulation evades the potential 
harms of taxi-favoring local governments by regulating at a more removed level of 
government and preserving the innovative TNC business model.357 Such regulations also 
protect citizens from expensive, monopolistic local transportation markets by protecting 
new market entrants.358 Moreover, state regulation expands safe for-hire service 
operations throughout states—increasing transportation options outside of major cities.359 
Although states are not as close as municipalities to local transportation market 
concerns and issues, states are better suited to solve localized transportation issues than 
the federal government—an entity even further removed from local concerns.360 The 
differences between the regulations in California and Colorado, and the attention given to 
each state’s individual concerns during the rulemaking processes, illustrate this advantage 
to state regulation.361 The California PUC, for example, acknowledged and discussed the 
specified issues TNCs presented across the state, rather than the generalized issues facing 
all states and municipalities throughout the country.362 
C. Plausibility of State TNC Regulation 
Although limousines differ from TNCs, state limousine regulation exemplifies the 
plausibility of regulating for-hire transportation at the state level.363 Further, unlike federal 
TNC regulation, state regulation continues to grow in popularity throughout the United 
States.364 
Not only is state regulation entirely plausible, but TNCs support the state regulations 
enacted thus far.365 John Zimmer, co-founder and President of Lyft, stated that 
California’s regulatory framework “sets the stage and creates a responsible process and 
common sense regulations.”366 Sunil Paul, co-founder and CEO of Sidecar, stated that 
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California’s set of rules “sets a good precedent.”367 Further, a Lyft spokesperson praised 
Colorado’s regulations, stating that “[b]y creating a common-sense regulatory framework 
for [TNCs] that prioritizes public safety and consumer choice, Colorado has stepped up as 
a leader in welcoming innovative, community-powered transportation options.”368 The 
spokesperson further noted that Colorado’s regulations “forg[e] a path for other 
jurisdictions to follow.”369 
D. Considerations in State TNC Regulation 
Like California and Colorado, a state agency like the Public Utilities Commission 
could hold the responsibility for regulating TNCs.370 State agencies are in the best position 
to be knowledgeable about transportation issues and needs.371 However, it may be best for 
state lawmakers to enact legislation delegating rulemaking responsibility to a specified 
agency.372 Unlike the Colorado PUC, the California PUC initiated its rulemaking without 
express delegation from the legislature.373 This resulted in a recent debacle when the 
DMV, another state agency, attempted to place additional restraints on TNCs through its 
own, independent ruling.374 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although TNCs like Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar enjoy various competitive advantages 
over taxicabs and other for-hire services, various legal issues plague TNCs.375 Taxicab 
companies across the United States, facing stringent regulations, complain that 
governments should regulate TNCs in a manner comparable to taxicab regulation.376 
Governments throughout the United States struggle with regulating TNCs in a 
manner that balances safety concerns with the public’s best interest in having a competitive 
transportation market.377 California was the first state to adopt statewide TNC regulations 
through the California PUC, and Colorado was the first state to adopt statewide legislation 
to regulate TNCs.378 Various cities have adopted TNC regulation at the local level, 
including Chicago and Austin.379 
A consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of regulation at the federal, 
state, and local levels demonstrates that other states should follow the regulatory path taken 
by California and Colorado.380 Although federal regulation represents centralized rules 
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removed from local corruption, federal regulation may be too far removed from local 
transportation markets to adequately solve local issues and concerns.381 Local regulation, 
on the other hand, allows those individuals who are familiar with local markets to address 
localized concerns.382 However, a history of cozy relationships between local 
governments and taxicab companies, as well as the recent barriers TNCs have faced when 
attempting to enter local transportation markets, illustrate the high risk that local TNC 
regulation will burden TNCs’ innovative business model and citizens’ transportation 
options.383 
State regulation presents the best balance between these conflicting concerns.384 
Differing regulations among fifty states may lead to TNCs uniformly adopting the strictest 
standards or some economic burdens.385 Contrasted against a potentially stagnant federal 
regulation, however, state regulations can develop over time as each of the fifty state 
“laboratories” experience the effects of regulations.386 Although local regulations may 
also lead to more effective rules over time, the sheer number of local “laboratories” 
presents a high risk of inefficiency.387 
Additionally, state regulation removes TNC regulation from local governments.388 
Thus, state regulation promotes innovation potentially hindered by anti-competitive local 
governments and protects customers from municipalities attempting to shield existing 
taxicab companies from competition.389 Unlike federal regulation, however, state 
regulation may be close enough to local for-hire markets to adequately address local 
concerns.390 State limousine regulations, as well as California’s and Colorado’s statewide 
TNC regulations, demonstrate that this kind of regulation is not unprecedented.391 
Additionally, TNCs have praised California’s and Colorado’s regulatory models as 
“innovative” and “a good precedent.”392 All states should consider statewide regulation 
of TNCs in order to promote innovation, protect citizens, and adequately address the 
numerous concerns regarding TNC operations.393 
Katherine E. O’Connor 
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